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A "Preposterous Anomaly":
Sovereign Immunity in Kentucky Following the
Crash of Comair Flight 5191
NathanielR. Kissel'
INTRODUCTION

AT

6:05 a.m. on August 27, 2006, the calm of a quiet Sunday morning
in Lexington, Kentucky, was quickly brought to a halt. Shortly after
takeoff, Comair flight 5191, en route to Atlanta, crashed to the earth as it ran
out of runway.' It left in its wake 50,000 pounds of debris and jet fuel, and
forty-nine of the fifty people on board were killed.3 The crash of Comair
flight 5191 was the worst commercial air disaster in Lexington's history
and ended one of the longest sustained periods of safety in U.S. aviation
history.4
Listed among the victims were many friends and familiar faces to the
residents of Lexington. They included teachers, business owners, pastors,
horse trainers and students. 5 As the realization of the tragedy began to
set in, the investigation into the cause of the accident came into focus.
When the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) finally released
its conclusions on the crash in July of 2007, the blame primarily landed
on the shoulders of the pilots. 6 In the final report issued by the NTSB
on July 27, the probable cause of the accident was attributed to "the
flight crewmembers' failure to use available cues and aids to identify the
airplane's location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to
cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before
I Associate with Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC; B.A. Centre College, 2003; J.D. University
of Kentucky College of Law, 2oo9. The author would like to thank his family and his wife
Megan for their help through these last three years.
2 See Amy Wilson, Crash Kills 49, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), Aug. z8, zoo6, at
Ai, available at http://www.kentucky.com/6o4/story/Io626.html. All online information was
retrieved from the Lexington Herald-Leader's "The Crash of Comair Flight 5191" database,
availableat http://www.kentucky.com/6o4 (last visited Mar. 5, zoo).
3 Wilson, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 See Profiles of All on Board, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), June 14, 2007, http://
www.kentucky.com/638/story/9758 i .html.
6 NTSB, NTSB/AAR-o7/o5, AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT. ATrEMPTED TAKEOFF FROM
WRONG RUNWAY, COMAIR FLIGHT 5191, BOMBARDIER CL-6oo-2B 19, N43ICA, LEXINGTON, Ky.,

AUG. 27, 2OO6 x (2007), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictnl2oo7/AARoo5.pdf.
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takeoff."7
Blue Grass Airport was "largely cleared" by the report.8 In discussing
a paving project at the airport as a probable factor in the confusion of the
pilots prior to takeoff, the report concluded that the failure of the controller
to alert the pilots to the configuration "was likely not a factor in the crew's
inability to navigate to the correct runway."9 Though the report noted
that notice about the construction was not in the flight release paperwork,
the report did not find that the construction was a probable cause of the
accident."
The NTSB report would not be the only assignment of blame, as the
surviving families of victims filed a number of lawsuits following the crash,
including a suit filed September 1, 2006, by the family of Rebecca Adams
against Comair, Inc. ("Comair")." In this suit, the family of Adams alleged
wrongful death and common carrier negligence."2 In May 2007, Comair
named Blue Grass Airport as a third-party defendant in the action, alleging
that the airport had contributed to the accident with negligence in lighting,
markers and signage, construction work, and inaccurate navigational charts
and notices. 3 A federal suit naming the Blue Grass Airport as a defendant
had been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. 4 Blue Grass Airport's
role in the Comair litigation would, however, take a notable turn in August
of 2007, when Fayette Circuit Judge James Ishmael dismissed the airport
from the litigation, ruling that as an instrumentality of the LexingtonFayette Urban County Government (LFUCG), the Blue Grass Airport and
the Airport Board shared in the merged government's sovereign immunity
from suit. 5
From its ancient roots, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has come to
serve a strange role in modern society and has had an awkward and often
contradictory history in the state of Kentucky. Judge Ishmael's decision set
the stage for another chapter in Kentucky's long and difficult history with
the doctrine. As evidence of the case's importance, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky ultimately took the case from the Court of Appeals and heard
7 Id.
8 Janet Patton & Brandon Ortiz, NTSB Report Praised with Some Exceptions, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER

(Ky.), July

27,

2007, at At 2.

9 NTSB, supra note 6, at Io1.
Io Id.
II Complaint, Adams v. Comair, Inc., No. o6-CI-3749,

Ct. Sept.
12

2007

WL 4858922 (Fayette Cir.

1,2oo6).

Id.

13 Defendantsffhird-Party Plaintiffs' Third-Party Complaint, Adams v. Comair, Inc.,
No. o6-CI-3749, 2007 WL 4320786 (Fayette Cir. Ct. May 25, 2007).
14 Brandon Ortiz, Comair Tags Airport as Defendant in Lawsuit, LEXINGTON HERALDLEADER (Ky.), May 23, 2007, at B3.
15 Adams v. Comair, Inc., No. o6-CI-3749, 2007 WL 4858922 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. o,
2007) (order dismissing "Airport Defendants" from third party complaint).
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oral arguments in August of 2008.16 When the court made its decision
more than a year later, the court unanimously affirmed Judge Ishmael's
decision, protecting Blue Grass Airport from suit, and classifying it as an
instrumentality of the LFUCG performing a governmental function, and
thus cloaked in the immunity of its creator.17
This Note will trace just some of the confusing and often contradictory
history of governmental immunity in Kentucky, a path that will lead
through the concepts of municipal and county immunity, as well as the
establishment of the LFUCG itself and its effect on the concept of
governmental immunity. Part I discusses the development of immunity in
Kentucky, weaving through issues of state, county and municipal liability,
as well as the status of Blue Grass Airport. These concepts all contributed
to the confusion surrounding the state of governmental immunity in
Kentucky prior to Justice Mary Noble's opinion in the Comair case, and
perhaps necessitated the court's efforts to "lay the cards on the table," in
explaining the role of precedent in immunity determinations.1 8 Part II
analyzes the recent Comair decision, which has seen the Supreme Court
take a step towards revitalization of the doctrine.
Ultimately, in Part III, this Note argues that the Kentucky Supreme
Court missed an opportunity to truly reexamine the doctrine of
governmental immunity as seen through the particularly troublesome
lens of its application to the Blue Grass Airport and the LFUCG. In its
affirmation of Judge Ishmael's decision, the court gutted the heavily relied
upon precedent it had provided Kentucky courts in Kentucky Centerfor the
Arts Corp. v. Berns,1 9 and took a step backwards in what had once been
a deliberate march towards the limitation of the ancient and antiquated
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
I. A GLANCE AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN KENTUCKY

The concept of sovereign immunity in Kentucky has a long and
labyrinthine history, and several commentators have made efforts to trace
through this maze of cases. 0 As noted by Angela S. Fetcher in her note,
Outdated,Confusing,and Unfair: A Glimpse atSovereign Immunity in Kentucky,

16 Comair Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 94
(Ky. 2oo9).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 99.
19 Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 8o S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 199o).
20 See Angela S. Fetcher, Note, Outdated, Confusing, and Unfair: A Glimpse at Sovereign
Immunity in Kentucky, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 959 (2003); see also Earl E Hamm, Jr., Note, The
Reemergence of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in Kentucky, 87 Ky. L.J. 439 (1999); Christopher J.
Arlinghaus, Note, Board of Education of Rockcastle County v. Kirby:A Significant Rerreatfrom
Sovereign Immunityfor School Districts in Kentucky, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 319 (1997).
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"[a]lthough sovereign immunity is a deep-rooted doctrine in American
jurisprudence that began just after the signing of the United States
Constitution, it is an anomaly that is difficult to trace in Kentucky and even
more difficult to comprehend and apply.""1
The Kentucky Supreme Court has acknowledged that the concept of
sovereign immunity for municipal, county, or local district communities
grew from a 1788 English decision, Russell v. Men of Devon.2 In Russell, the
plaintiff was injured by a wagon as a result of a bridge in disrepair. 3 The
court in Russell faced two competing fundamental principles of law, yet
found that sovereign immunity outweighed other interests stating,
[I]t has been said that there is a principle of law on which this action might
be maintained, namely, that where an individual sustains an injury by the
neglect or default of another, the law gives him a remedy. But there is
another general principal of law which is more applicable to this case, that
it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public
should suffer an inconvenience. Now if this action could be sustained, the
public would suffer a great inconvenience .... 14
Thus, despite any interest in redressing a wrong, immunity prevented the
plaintiff's recovery.
A. MunicipalLiability
The history and development of municipal liability in Kentucky is
described in detail in Haney v. City of Lexington."5 The concept was first
described by Kentucky courts in Pratherv. City of Lexington, where it was
apparently rejected.16 In Prather,the plaintiff alleged that a mob defaced her
boarding house, rendering it uninhabitable, and that the city of Lexington
and police failed to protect her property. 7 The action was brought against the
city in its corporate capacity, and not against the particular officers who had
failed to respond.2 s The court held that "[w]here a particular act, operating
injuriously to an individual, is authorized by a municipal corporation, by a
delegation of power either general or special, it will be liable for the injury
in its corporate capacity, where the acts done would warrant a like action

21

Fetcher, supra note

22
23

See Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
Russell v. Men of Devon, ioo Eng.Rep. 359,36o-61 (K.B. 1788).

24

Id.at 363.

20,

at 959-

Haney, 386 S.Wzd at 739.
26 Prather v. City of Lexington, 13 Ky. (i B. Mon.) 559 (Ky. 1852).
25

27

Id.

28 Id. at 2.
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against an individual." 9 The court also noted that liability had previously
been imposed on municipal corporations for negligence in the construction
of public works and in the failure to keep streets and sewers in proper
repair.30 Ultimately, liability for the plaintiff's injury was denied in Prather
only because it was determined that there was no duty for a municipality to
protect residents against mob violence.3'
Whatever confusion may have existed about municipal liability was put
to rest with the case of Haney v. City of Lexington.3" The case involved the
drowning of a seven-year-old girl in the public swimming pool at Woodland
Park in Lexington.33 While giving a thorough review of what it called a
"legal anachronism," 34 the court recognized governmental immunity's
many failings.35 "There is probably no tenet in our law that has been more
universally berated by courts and legal writers than the governmental
immunity doctrine. 3 6 Criticisms of the doctrine were "wide-ranging
and highly varied," but included the unfairness of imposing the burden
of damage caused by the municipality on individuals instead of on the
community, where it should have rightfully rested. The doctrine deprived
citizens of "life, liberty, and property without due process of law," and ran
"counter to a basic concept underlying the law of torts .... that liability
follows negligence."38 The court stated that, in the past, it "accepted the
theory with reluctance" and "seized upon almost any excuse, however
flimsy, to grant relief to any person harmed by negligence of a municipal
corporation."3 9 The court recognized that the doctrine had already been
chipped away at, as distinctions had been drawn between governmental or
public functions and proprietary or private functions, with liability being
imposed in the proprietary settings. 4° The court stated that courts use these
"contrived devices" to prevent unjust application of sovereign immunity
with "a few escape hatches.""'
Haney was indeed a landmark decision, as Kentucky's highest court
chose to reject the concept of governmental immunity for municipalities,
Id.
30 Id.
29

31

Id. at 3.

Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 SW.zd 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
33 Id. at 738.
34 Id. at 739.
35 Id. at 739-4236 Id. at 739 (citation omitted).
37 Haney, 386 S.W.2d at 739 (quoting James M. Talley, Jr., Torts-JudicialAbrogaionofthe
Doctrineof MunicipalImmunity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C. L. REV. 29o , 291 (963)).
38 Id.
39 Id. (citing V.TC. Lines, Inc. v. Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1958)).
40 Id. at 740-41.
32

41 Id. at 74o.
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noting that "when established things are no longer secure in a fast changing
world, the courts should re-examine the precedents and determine if they
provide a proper standing under present conditions."4 This pragmatic
approach to the changing landscape of tort law found the court examining
its prior decisions alongside the Supreme Court of Florida, where school
district tort immunity had been eliminated in 1957.41 To make their
intentions entirely clear, the court concluded its discussion in Haney with
the following passage:
Perhaps clarity will be afforded by our expression that henceforward, so
far as governmental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liabilitytheexception is immunity. In determining the tort liability of a municipality it is
no longer necessary to divide its operations into those which are proprietary
and those which are governmental. Our decision does not broaden the
government's obligation so as to make it responsible for all harms to others;
it is only as to those harms which are torts that governmental bodies are to
be liable by reason of this decision.'
It is important to note that the court limited the effect of its decision in
Haney through its final words. In conclusion, the court stated, "It is not
our intention at this time to consider the liability of any governmental unit
45
other than that of a municipal corporation and its agents."
46
The "clarity" wished for by the court in Haney would not last long.
While the court's words in Haney appear clear, the Kentucky Supreme
Court would later note that the Kentucky Court of Appeals continued
to find ways to apply the doctrine around these limitations. 47 In Gas
Service Co. v. City of London, Justice Leibson noted that "since Haney[,] we
find Court of Appeals cases, including the present one, now classifying
negligence in maintenance and repair of sewers as immune from liability,
on new grounds presumably deriving from our post Haney opinions. '4 Such
negligence previously fell under the label of a proprietary action which
was not protected by sovereign immunity. 49 Justice Leibson noted that
"subsequent decisions have so circumscribed [Haney's] language that we
have regressed beyond its starting point."5 To Justice Leibson, sovereign
Id. at 740-41.
43 Id. (citing Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957)).
44 Id. at 742 (emphasis added) (quoting Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, i15 N.W.2d 618,
42

625 (Wis. 1962)).
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
See Gas Serv. Co. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985).
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
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immunity was a "judicially created monstrosity which should be judicially
destroyed."'" The court described how the waters were muddied since
the clarity of Haney by outlining a line of cases providing exceptions to the
basic premise that sovereign immunity does not apply to municipalities."
Much of this hesitance to apply the clear rule of Haney appeared to be
based on concerns over the financial impact to municipalities, but Justice
Leibson noted that "problems with payment [have] never been a defense
53
to an otherwise valid claim.
The Court in Gas Service overruled the cases that carved out exceptions
to the abolition of municipal immunity. s4 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
reaffirmed its decision in Haney, holding that the only exception to Haney's
rule is for torts committed in "the exercise of legislative or judicial or quasilegislative or quasi-judicial functions."55 These limited exceptions are also
now codified in KRS 65.2003(3).56
B. State and County Immunity: FurtherComplications
Unlike municipal immunity, the concept of state and county immunity
is arguably protected by statute. The Commonwealth of Kentucky's
immunity from suit, while perhaps not specifically established by its
text, is controlled by the Kentucky Constitution. Section 231 of the
Kentucky Constitution states, "The General Assembly may, by law, direct
in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth."" Further legislation set up a Board of Claims that hears
actions and decides the amount of compensation." The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has continued to hold that county governments are cloaked in

51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.

Id.
Id.at 148-49.

Id. at 15o.
Id. at 149 (quoting Haney v. City of Lexington, 384 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Ky. 1964)).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65.2003(3) (LexisNexis 2004); see also 13 David J. Leibson, Ky.
PRACTICE: TORT LAW § 10:48 (2d ed. 2oo8). Leibson notes that at first, the section seems to
codify the Haney exceptions, but goes further, also excepting some acts of judgment or discretion, perhaps making relevant some of the terms that the Haney court sought to eliminate. Id.
57 KY.CONST. § 231.
58 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.070() (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009). But see Yancro v.
Davis, 65 S.W.3 d 510,523-24 (Ky. 2001) ("ITihe words 'sovereign immunity' are not found in
the Constitution of Kentucky. Rather, sovereign immunity is a common law concept recognized as an inherent attribute of the state.... Thus, contrary to assertions sometimes found
in our case law, Sections 23o and 231 of our Constitution are not the source of sovereign
immunity in Kentucky, but are provisions that permit the General Assembly to waive the
Commonwealth's inherent immunity either by direct appropriation of money from the state
treasury (Section 23o) and/or by specifying where and in what manner the Commonwealth
may be sued (Section 231).").
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59
the state's sovereign immunity.
Though it is firmly rooted, the continuation of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity for state and county agencies has not been without its detractors.
In Cullinan v. Jefferson County, the predecessor to the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that sovereign immunity barred recovery from the Jefferson
County Board of Education. 60 Justice Palmore, however, wrote a powerful
dissent, calling the doctrine of sovereign immunity both "'shocking"'
and "inexcusable," as it has been extended beyond suits against the
Commonwealth as defined in Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution
that would constitute a claim upon the state treasury.6' Justice Palmore
believed that sovereign immunity should be limited, because "in a civilized
62
society it is morally indefensible.
In his argument against sovereign immunity, Justice Palmore described
a situation in which an average citizen is run down in the street by a reckless
motorist. 63 If that motorist is a private citizen, the victim has recourse, but
not where that motorist is employed by "one of the myriad governmental
agencies which today engage in so many activities formerly considered to
lie within the exclusive domain of private enterprise." 64 Justice Palmore
labeled such a situation as "offensive on its face," and opined that "[tihe
average man in the street never heard of sovereign immunity and would
scarcely believe it if he did." 6s Justice Palmore regarded sovereign
immunity as a "preposterous anomaly," and closed his dissent by quoting a
state of the union address from Abraham Lincoln: "'It is as much the duty
of Government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as
it is to administer the same between private individuals. ' 66
Issues surrounding governmental immunity of the Commonwealth and
its agencies were perhaps best encapsulated by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Yanero v. Davis, decided in 2001.67 While much of Yanero
concerned official immunity, which protected government officials in their
exercises of discretion, it also contained a discussion of a host of other
issues surrounding immunity.68 Notably, the court in Yanero distinguished
"sovereign immunity" from "governmental immunity," noting that the two

59 See Schwindel v. Meade County, 113 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003).
6o Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.zd 407,410 (Ky. 1967).
61 Id. at 411. (Palmore, J., dissenting) (quoting E. H. SchoplerAnnotation,Immuniy from
Liabilityfor Damages in Tort of State or Governmental Unit or Agency in Operating Hospital,25
A.L.R. 203 (1952)).
6z Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 51o (Ky. 2001).
68 Id.
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have often been confused and used interchangeably by courts in Kentucky.69
The Supreme Court of Kentucky succinctly defined governmental
immunity as "'the public policy, derived from the traditional doctrine of
sovereign immunity, that limits imposition of tort liability on a government
agency."' 70
Importantly, the court in Yanero noted that while the proprietary/
governmental distinction had been abandoned for municipalities in
Haney, "it has been employed by this Court in two subsequent opinions
to determine whether an agency created by the state was entitled to
immunity."7 The court acknowledged the problem of inconsistent results
using the proprietary/governmental distinction when determining the
liability of a governmental entity noted by the court in Haney, but deemed
its use reasonable in the context of a state agency, noting:
[T]hat analysis has the attribute of relative simplicity in application and
affords a reasonable compromise between allowing state agencies to perform
their governmental functions without having to answer for their decisions in
the context of tort litigation, and allowing private enterprises to pursue their
legitimate business interests without unfair competition from government
agencies performing purely proprietary functions without the same costs
and risks inherent in commercial enterprise. 7
Because of its relative usefulness, the proprietary/governmental distinction
survives in Kentucky's jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most important piece of the sovereign immunity puzzle was
added by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Kentucky Centerforthe Arts Corp.
v. Berns.73 Berns concerned a slip-and-fall action filed against the Kentucky
Center for the Arts, and a central issue was whether the organization, 7a4
state entity, was entitled to the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity.
The court recognized that "certainly not every business can be immunized
simply because it is established by act of the General Assembly," and
the Kentucky Center for the Arts acts very much the same as any other
business in the entertainment industry.7" In its analysis, the court could
not determine how a patron at the facility (which had previously been
privately owned) could be deprived of a right to an action simply based on
this change in ownership, recognizing that to follow this reasoning would
69 Id. at 517-i9.
70 Id. at 519 (quoting 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §
io (2oo9)).
71 Id. at 520.
72 Id. at 521.
73 Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 8oi S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 199o).
74 Id. at 328.
75 Id. at 331.
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provide "no limitation on the scope of sovereign immunity."7 6 "Every time
the state gets involves [sic] in an enterprise formerly private the area of
sovereign immunity would expand accordingly.""
The court then established what became known as the "Berns test"-a
two-prong analysis to determine whether a state-created entity is entitled to
sovereign immunity.78 While outlined clearly in Berns, the court recognized
that the test borrowed the "fundamental premise"7 9 of court precedent
stated in the earlier case of Gnau v. Louisville &Jefferson County Metropolitan
Sewer Dist.,80 that sovereign immunity should be granted "'only to those
agencies which are under the direction and control of the central State
government and are supported by monies which are disbursed by authority
of the Commissioner of Finance out of the State treasury."' 81 Accordingly,
the test consists of an analysis of (1) "'the direction and control of the
central State government"' on the corporation and (2) support by "'monies
which are disbursed by authority of the Commissioner of Finance out of
the State treasury."' 8 Ultimately, the Kentucky Center for the Arts failed
the Berns test.83
Berns recognized a dichotomy between unprotected "municipal
corporation[s]" and immune state agencies, noting that the sweep of the
court's decision in Haney was wider than merely removing the protection
previously enjoyed by cities." A "'municipal corporation' means nothing
more than a local government entity created by the state to carry out
'designated' functions."" The Berns court noted that in Stephenson v.
Louisville &Jefferson County Board. of Health,M a local board of health was
determined to be a "'municipal corporation"' and therefore unprotected
through Haney.87 The court further elaborated on this distinction, noting
that "[t]he line between what is a state agency and what is a municipal
corporation is not divided by whether the entity created by state statute
is or is not a city, but whether, when viewed as a whole, the entity is

76
77
78
79
8o

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 346 S.Wzd 754 (Ky.
1961).
6
81 Berns, 8oi S.W.zd at 331 (quoting Gnau, 34 S.W.2d at 755).
at
755).
8z Id. at 331 (quoting Gnau, 346 S.W2d
83 Id.
84 Id. at 332.
85 Id. (quoting Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 217 S.W2d
232, 236 (Ky. i949)).
86 Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 389 S.W.zd 637, 638 (Ky.
1965).
87 Berns, 8oi S.W.2d at 332.
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carrying out a function integral to state government."' Further, the court
states "sovereign immunity should extend only to 'departments, boards or
agencies that are such integral parts of state government as to come within
regular patterns of administrative organization and structure." 's,
When viewed as a whole, the test outlined in Berns, which looks
to control and funding, is similar in its analysis and application to the
proprietary/governmental distinction that the court in Yanero deemed still
appropriate for state agencies. This view is supported by Withers v. University
of Kentucky, a case that is primarily known for its holding that the purchase of
insurance does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.90 In Withers,
the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed the immunity of the University
of Kentucky Medical Center in a medical malpractice claim. 91 The court
upheld the University of Kentucky's right to sovereign immunity, noting
that the university itself passes both the funding and control elements of
the Berns test.9 In response to a challenge that the University of Kentucky
Medical Center was performing the same sort of proprietary duties as one
of the many private hospitals in the world, the analysis slipped back into
the governmental/proprietary distinction. "The answer to this contention is
simple. The operation of a hospital is essential to the teaching and research
function of the medical school. Medical school accreditation standards
require comprehensive education and training and without a hospital, such
would be impossible." 93 The hospital is a necessary part of the University
of Kentucky, an immune governmental unit, and is therefore entitled to
94
share in its immunity.
The court in Withers noted that there is powerful precedential value in
affording sovereign immunity to an agency.9 Justice Lambert reasoned
that "[o]nce it has been determined that an entity is entitled to sovereign
immunity, this Court has no right to merely refuse to apply it or abrogate the
legal doctrine." 96 The importance of the Berns analysis was again affirmed
as Justice Lambert called its standards "a test.., to determine whether an
entity possesses the immunity of the Commonwealth." 97
Leading up to Justice Mary Noble's opinion in the Comair decision,
the Kentucky Supreme Court faithfully applied the Berns test, notably in

88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Withers v.Univ. of Ky., 939 S.W.zd 340,346 (Ky. 1997).
91 Id. at 342.

Id. at 343.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 34492

96 Id.
97 Id. at 346.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 98

Kea-Ham Contracting,Inc. v. Floyd County Development Authority.98 In KeaHam, the court held that the Floyd County Development Authority was
a municipal corporation that was not entitled to sovereign immunity.99
Though the corporation received grants from state agencies and its board
was appointed by the county judge-executive, the authority received
funds from a variety of other sources and had the ability to borrow on its
own credit.'0° In regards to the funding element, the court noted that "the
source offunding for any individual project is not determinative of sovereign
immunity, as this determination is made by analyzing the entity, not the
specific project." 1 ' In regards to the control issue, Justice Lambert noted
that board members, though appointed by the county judge-executive, have
a great deal of independence.0 2 Justice Lambert stated that "[aipplication
of the two-part Berns test to the Authority indicates that it is a municipal
103
corporation unprotected from suit by the shield of sovereign immunity."
The Floyd County Development Authority, which appeared to be closely
associated with the immune agency that created it, failed both aspects of
the Berns test, and was held to be an independent, non-immune municipal
4
corporation by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.?
C. Urban County Governments
So where does this tangle of common law leave merged governments
like the LFUCG? While the courts have had a great deal to say about
immunity of municipalities and counties, very little has been said about
the concept of an urban county government such as the LFUCG. Should
Lexington (which was the subject of the Haney decision) be treated as
a municipality and held liable for its torts, or should it be granted the
immunity of a county? When Lexington merged with Fayette County in
1974,105 did it discharge the liability that the Haney decision left the city
with just ten years earlier?
Reviewing the charter of the LFUCG yields some help in understanding
its nature. Under Article 3 "Powers of the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government," general powers are listed as not only the "powers
and privileges which cities of the second class are, or may hereafter be,
authorized or required to exercise under the Constitution and general laws
98 Kea-Ham Contracting, Inc. v. Floyd County Dcv. Auth., 37 S.W3d 703 (Ky.
99 Id. at 76.
ioo Id. at 7o6-07.
ioi Id. at 7o7.
102 Id. at 7o6.
103 Id.
1o4

2000).

Id.

105 See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't: Chief ofPolice, http://www.lexingtonky.

gov/index.aspx?page-68 (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
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of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," but also "[s]uch other powers and
privileges which counties are, or may hereafter be, authorized or required to
exercise under the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.06' The LFUCG is also granted "powers and privileges as urban
county governments may be authorized or required to exercise under the
Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky." 07 The
LFUCG thus appears to have all of the powers of a county yet none of the
limitations of a municipality.
Perhaps most telling, the Kentucky Supreme Court has also continued
to recognize the existence of Fayette County following the creation of the
LFUCG and the sovereign immunity retained by the LFUCG1°s As the
court noted in Lexington-FayetteUrban County Governmentv. Smolcic,previous
decisions have made it "clear that the urban county form of government is a
new classification of county governmentcreated by the General Assembly."l°9
Accordingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has determined that LFUCG
continues to share in the Commonwealth's immunity." '
D. Blue GrassAirport
Where does this leave the Blue Grass Airport's claim to sovereign
immunity in the Comair crash case? The answer may seem simple at
first glance, as courts have also directly addressed the issue of Blue Grass
Airport's sovereign immunity. In Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Airport Board, the Court of Appeals decided that the Bluegrass Airport
was entitled to immunity as it is essentially a sub-agency of the LFUCG,
making Inco perhaps the most central case in the Comair immunity
discussions."' Inco involved nearly $85,000 in damages sustained by a jet
when it plowed into a snow bank while landing."' The Court of Appeals
stated that while "[m]uch has been written concerning the abolition of
municipal immunity[,] ... the judiciary has refrained from tampering with
our Constitution (Section 231) and the functions of the General Assembly
(Constitution Sections 27, 28, and 29) with respect to sovereign or state

io6 See

LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN CouNTY GOVERNMENT,

Ky.,

CHARTER AND CODE OF

art. 3, §3.01 (1999 & Supp. 2oo9), availableat http://www.municode.con/resources/gateway.asp?pid= i 163&sid= 17 (emphasis added).
ORDINANCES

107 Id.

io8 See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004);
Hoisclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1974).
109 Smolic, 142 S.W.3d at 131.
i o Id.
i i, Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Bd., 705 S.W.2d 933, 934-35
(Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
112 Id.at 933.
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immunity.""' 3 The court then held that the LFUCG retained immunity,
as "there can be no argument that the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Governmental Unit is a county and thus entitled to the protection afforded
the state.""I4
The Court of Appeals then attempted to clear up any confusion that
might have surrounded the status of the LFUCG: "We point out that
one should not be misled into the perception that Fayette County is in
reality a municipal (city) corporation for the courts have pointed out on
at least three occasions that the City of Lexington ceased to exist on the
day that urban county government became effective."I" Citing precedent,
the court noted that by statute, "urban county government retains the
immunities of county government. It is, like a county government, an arm
of the state entitled to the protective cloak of sovereign immunity. This case
should have been dismissed upon that ground."" 6 The court emphasized
that in Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, sovereign
immunity-as opposed to municipal immunity-was applied, establishing
that cases abolishing municipal immunity have no effect on the status of
the LFUCG. "I Further, the court stated that "[w]ith the demise of the
city, then every function it sponsored became a county agency prior to the
8
time of the tort involved in this appeal.""
But how much weight is to be given to the Inco decision? It is not a
Kentucky Supreme Court decision and was decided years before the Berns
test was even established." 9 Attorneys for the Blue Grass Airport noted,
however, that the Kentucky Supreme Court cited Inco in the Smolcicdecision
favorably, and argued that the court also denied discretionary review in the
Inco case while ordering it published.2 0 Yet the concurrence in Inco made
important points about the nature of Blue Grass Airport. Judge Wilhoit
noted in his concurrence that by virtue of the text of its enabling statute,
KRS § 183.132, the Airport Board was "'a body politic and corporate with
the usual corporate attributes.""121KRS § 183.132, titled "Local air boards,"
113 Id. at 934.
114 Id. (citing Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 641 S.W.2d 51 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1982)).
15 Id. (citing Jacobs v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 560 S.W.zd io (Ky.
1978); Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1973); Hemrpel,641 S.W.2d 51).
116 Id.at 934 n.i (quoting Hempel, 641 S.W.zd at 53).
17 Id. at 934.
ij8 Id.
i i9 Id. at 933.
120 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendants
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport
Board, & All Known Airport Board Members Who May be Included Among the John Does,
i-zo at 16, Adams v. Comair, No. o6-CI-o3749 (Fayette Cir. Ct. July 17, 2007) [hereinafter
Supplemental Memorandum].
121 Inco, 705 S.W.2d at 935 (Wilhoit, J., concurring) (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 183.132(z)
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also stated that the board, "in its corporate name may sue and be sued,
contract and be contracted with, and do all things reasonable or necessary
to effectively carry out the duties prescribed by statute." 122
Judge Wilhoit contended that "[ais a 'body politic and corporate,'
the board is plainly not a unit of the urban county government, but an
independent entity which performs designated governmental functions
including limited legislative functions. I believe that under our case
law such an entity constitutes a quasi-municipal corporation."1"3 Wilhoit
expressed his doubts as to how the Kentucky Supreme Court would handle
the liability of such an organization, but noted that in prior case law, such
"'quasi-municipal corporations'" had been treated as state agencies for
purposes of liability for negligence. 114 The case cited by Judge Wilhoit,
Fawbushv. Louisville &Jefferson County MetropolitanSewer District,described
how these organizations are to be treated:
[T]here is a distinction between municipal corporations proper and quasimunicipal corporations concerning liability for torts, and . . . the general
rule is that the latter are not liable for torts unless so provided by statute.
Although the authorities are by no means uniform, the rule has been applied
to a wide variety of governmental and political organizations, including
drainage districts, utility districts, improvement districts, townships, and, of
2
course, counties. 1
The Fawbush court explained that the reason for immunity for "quasipublic corporations" is generally due to their "involuntary and public
character. They are usually treated as public or state agencies, and their
' 6
duties are ordinarily wholly governmental."'
1
The court further reasoned
that such organizations "'exercise the greater part of their functions as
agencies of the state merely, and are created for purposes of public policy,
and hence the general rule that they are not responsible for the neglect of
12 7
duties enjoined on them, unless the action is given by statute.'
While Judge Wilhoit seemed hesitant to declare the Airport either a
sub-agency or a municipal corporation, and instead labeled it a "quasimunicipal corporation,"1 18 other entities with similar language in their
(West 2oo6)).

Ky.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.132(3) (LexisNexis 2003).
Inco, 705 S.Wzd at 935 (Wilhoit, J., concurring).
124 Id. (Wilhoit, J., concurring) (citing Fawbush v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro.
Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1951)).
125 Fawbush,240 S.W.2d at 624 (citing I8 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 53.05 (3d ed. 2003)).
126 Id. (quoting I8 McQUILuN, supra note 125, § 53.05) (emphasis added).
127 Id. (quoting 18 McQuIuIN,supra note 125 , § 53.05).
1z8 Inco, 705 S.W2d at 935 (Wilhoit, J., concurring).
122

123
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enabling legislation have been clearly classified as municipal corporations.
In Stephenson v. Louisville andJefferson County Boardof Health, the Kentucky
Supreme Court analyzed similar "'body politic and corporate' statutory
language, along with the power to "'sue and be sued,"' in the legislation
that created the Board of Health." 9 In this case, the court concluded that
"tilt seems clear that the Board of Health is a municipal corporation."130
The picture becomes even more confusing when following the citations
in Stephenson to Louisville andJefferson County Airport v. American Airlines,
where the Louisville and Jefferson County Airport is deemed to be
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," as well as a
an "instrumentality
"'municipality."'' 3 The court there cites the enabling legislation of KRS
183.476, which states that the functions of municipalities in aviation are
"public, governmental and municipal functions, exercised for a public
purpose, and matters of public necessity." 3 ' What then is the effect of
the landmark decision in Haney that eliminated municipal immunity?
While it would seem that this legislation undoubtedly defines the airport's
functions as governmental functions, the court in Stephenson cited Haney's
elimination of municipal immunity, stating that since the Board of Health
"is in the same category as .. .the Louisville and Jefferson County Air
of Lexington.
Board[,] ...it falls squarely under the decision in Haney v. City
133
and consequently cannot claim governmental immunity."
The Kentucky Supreme Court surveyed this puzzle of case law and
statutory law in Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County
The court
Metropolitan Sewer District,a post-Berns decision from 199 1 .134
attempted to clarify the reach of sovereign immunity, limiting its application
to situations where the Commonwealth is directly involved. 3 ' The court
36
looked to the limiting words ofJudge Palmore in Cullinan,citinghis dissent. 1
The court then called the weakening of the doctrine of immunity from
Haney to Berns the "enlightened path."' 37 The court further quoted Prosser
andKeaton on the Law of Torts, stating that "[tihe most striking feature of the
tort law of governmental entities today is that the immunities, once almost

129 Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 389 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Ky.

1965) (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.350 (West 2oo6)).
130 Id.
131 Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v.Am. Airlines, Inc., i6o F Supp. 771, 774
(W.D. Ky. 1958), rev'don othergrounds, 269 F.zd 811 (6th Cir. 1959) (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 183.476 (West 2006)).
132 Id. (quoting Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 183.476 (West 2006)).

133 Stephenson, 389 S.W.zd at 638 (citations omitted).
134 Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805
S.W.2d 133, 135-38 (Ky. 1991).
135 Id. at 137-38.
136 Id. at 138.

137 Id.
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total, have been largely abolished or severely restricted at almost all levels
... ." 138 Writing for the majority, Justice Leibson noted that Kentucky has
"progressed to the point where, as duty requires, we defer to the sovereign
immunity of the centralstategovernment mandated by §§ 230 and 231 of the
Constitution, but we reject extending sovereign immunity beyond 'what
the Constitution demands."'' 139 Then, with Judge Palmore's dissenting
words in Cullinan as their guide, the court stated that "[t]he concept that
the government can do no wrong or that the government cannot afford
to compensate those whom it wrongs in circumstances where a private
entity would be required to pay is unacceptable in a just society."140 The
court concluded that the municipal corporations of "MSD and the Board of
Health, when performing41services similar to a private corporation, should
be liable for their torts."
Given this conflicting case law, what is the nature of the Blue Grass
Airport? Several opinions of the Kentucky Attorney General have
addressed the proper categorization of the Blue Grass Airport, most notably
a 1986 opinion that addressed whether the Lexington-Fayette County
Airport Board was subject to prevailing wage law. 4 The Attorney General
examined precedent, including Gray v. CentralBank & Trust Co., where the
Court of Appeals interpreted the language of KRS 183.133 to determine
that the airport board is a legislative body, and thus, its members could not
be sued for their legislative statements while acting within the scope of
their duties. 43 The Attorney General also examined Inco, and determined
that
The aforecited case law is inconsistent in determining what this Board
is....

If the airport board is not a separate entity and is just a mere subagency
of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government and at the same
time is a "legislative body," then the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government has two legislative bodies-the urban county government's
council and the airport board.'"
The Attorney General wrote that to adhere to such an interpretation is to

138

Id.(citing W.PAGE

KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131

(5th ed. 1984)).
139 Id. (quoting Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.zd 407,411 (Ky. 1967) (Palmore,
J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
140 Calvet Investments, 805 S.W.2d at 138.
141 Id.
142 86 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (Ky. 1986).
143 Id.(citing Gray v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)).
144 Id.(emphasis added).
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"reach an untenable and ridiculous result."14 In deciding that the airport
board was not excluded from prevailing wage law, the Attorney General
noted that regardless of "[wihether the Board is a subagency of urban county
government or a separate local government entity, it, itself, is not a city, not
a county, and not an urban county government."' 146 The Attorney General
thus acknowledged the confusion in case law in regards to the nature of the
airport board, but was not required to determine the categorization of the
airport board in order to answer the wage question posed.
In an earlier opinion, the Attorney General recognized the LexingtonFayette Urban County Airport Board's status as "a public or municipal
corporation and an instrumentality of the Commonwealth."' 47 According
to the Attorney General, "[tihe airport board is thus a public body engaged
in public duties and is subject generally to generallaw applicableto municipal
corporations."48
These Attorney General opinions demonstrate the persistent confusion
about the exact legal nature of the airport board that would eventually
give rise to the Comair litigation. Given the confusion surrounding both
the state of immunity in the Commonwealth and the exact legal nature of
the airport, it is understandable that the litigation surrounding the Comair
crash brought many legal issues to the forefront. In an attempt to clarify
these issues, confusing legal distinctions have been made between state
agencies and municipal corporations, as well as between municipalities and
counties.

II.

DISMISSAL OF THE AIRPORT BOARD IN THE COMAIR LITIGATION

It is apparent from this snapshot of case law that the state of the law
prior to the Comair crash was far from clear with respect to sovereign or
governmental immunity in Kentucky. The last few decades have seen a
carving away at the idea of sovereign immunity, and case law has given
birth to tests for immunity such as in Berns. Yet, rules establishing absolute
sovereign immunity such as in Inco remain good law. This complicated
dichotomy between the Inco decision and the established Berns test set
the stage for Judge Ishmael's decision in August 2007 dismissing the Blue
Grass Airport entities from the Comair litigation.
Filed August 10, 2007, the "Order Dismissing'Airport Defendants' from
Third Party Complaint" dismissed the airport defendants. 49 On August 2,
Judge Ishmael heard arguments from each opposing side, and the discussion
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 8o Op. Att'y Gen. 333 (Ky. 198o).
148 Id. (emphasis added).
149 Adams v. Comair, Inc., No. o6-CI-3749 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 10, 2007) (order dismissing "Airport Defendants" from third party complaint).
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essentially came down to the conflict between the Inco case and the Berns
test.'5 0 These two cases seem wholly incompatible, as Inco provides absolute
sovereign immunity for the airport as an arm of the LFUCG, while Berns
seems to contemplate an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding each
individual case, and would thus not necessarily provide immunity to the
airport.'
A. Decision of the Fayette County Circuit Court
The airport's central contention was that the decision in Inco is still
clearly the law.' Attorney Kevin Henry said Comair attempted to argue
that Inco was overruled because of later cases like Berns and Kea-Ham that
dealt with municipal corporations, but the same kind of arguments were
made in the Smolcic decision, he said, where the urban county government
was dismissed." 3 The supreme court had the opportunity to limit the
4
sovereign immunity doctrine, but it instead chose to leave Inco intact.'The airport presented several cases to support the position that Inco
controlled. Estate of Clark v. Daviess County was a wrongful death case. 5
In Estate of Clark, the decedent was killed when her car drove off a county
road. 56 The court held that the decision of where to place guard rails and
warning signs was a discretionary act and, therefore, the county officials
and employees were immune from suit. 7 In its oral arguments, the
airport board characterized the runways and taxiways like "public roads
for airplanes," built by an immune agency."' All signage and lighting
regulations are controlled by federal law, and Henry noted that the airport
had been cleared of any violations following a federal investigation. i59
Schwindelv. Meade County, a case that dealt with an injury in a public park
and recreational softball complex, was also noted by the airport. 160 In its
Supplemental Memorandum, the airport stated that the case "continue[s]
to demonstrate unequivocally that counties enjoy sovereign immunity, and

150 Videotape: Adams v. Comair, Inc., No. o6-CI-3749, Certified Portion Tape 22/3/7/
VCR/6o, 13:02-4:56 (Fayette Cir. Ct. 2007) [hereinafter Videotape] (on file with author).
151 Id.
152

Id.

153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.; see also Estate of Clark v. Daviess County, 105 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Ky. Ct. App.

2003).
156
157
158
159
i6o

Estate of Clark, io5 S.W.3d at 843.
Id. at 846.
Videotape, supra note 15o.

Id.
Id. (citing Schwindel v. Meade County, 113 S.W.3d i59, 165-66 (Ky. 2003)).
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county agencies and county officials share that sovereign immunity."' 6
Berns was not applied in Schwinde/ because counties have absolute
sovereign immunity.'6 The airport is an arm of the LFUCG, it undergoes
an annual audit of financial statements, reports to the LFUCG, and there
is evidence that the airport corporation really does own the facilities, which
are financed through bonds, Henry said. "6 Thus, there is no question that
it is controlled by the government.
The airport also noted the recent case of Autry v. Western Kentucky
University, involving a dormitory fire at Western Kentucky University in
which a student died. 64 The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the
University was entitled to governmental immunity for nonproprietary
functions.' 6 The school's student life foundation was also found to share
immunity. 66 The airport was compared to the student life foundation in
Autry---both are controlled by an immune government entity.167 Henry
also noted the charter of the airport corporation, describing how the airport
board and the county government are to have supervisory control of the
airport corporation.' 6 "There can be no debate, your honor, that the airport
corporation is controlled by not one, but two immune county governments
or county government entities," Henry said.' 69
Attorney Edward Stopher spoke for Comair at the August 2 hearing. 70
Comair set out the essential conflict between the parties-the airport board
believed that Berns was totally inapplicable and that Inco was undeniably
the law, while Comair believed that Berns was the appropriate test. 7 '
Stopher said that the state of the law in Kentucky was not in a "static
fixed inoperable state," but rather it was "an evolutionary dynamic body
of common law." 72 Inco was decided by a divided court of appeals in 1985,
and there was no discretionary review as there was in Berns.'73 In Berns,
Justice Leibson propounded the idea that decisions regarding sovereign

161
162
163
164
165

Supplemental Memorandum, supranote I2o, at 17.
Videotape, supra note 150.
Id.
Autry v. W Ky. Univ., 219 S.W3d 713, 716 (Ky. 2007).
Id. at 717.

166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 719.
Videotape, supranote 15o.
Id.
Id.

Id.

Id.
Id.
173 Id. (citing Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Bd., 705 S.Wzd
933, 934-35 (Ky. Cc. App. 1985); Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 8oi S.W2d 327, 329 (Ky.
172

1990)).
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immunity were to be made on a case by case basis.'74 The appropriate line
for immunity was not one that could be drawn by the General Assembly.'
Comair contended that six years after Inco, the supreme court decided to
establish a specific factual test that was to be applied in every case for a
determination of sovereign immunity. 7 6 Stopher said the airport insisted
that Berns did not apply because the airport was determined to be immune
in Inco, but "there has never been, from that day to this, an analysis of the
'Berns test applied to the airport board." 177
So would the airport pass the Berns test? There is no control by the
central state government over the airport board, Stopher said.' 7 The
board members could only be removed for misconduct and conviction of a
felony.'7 9 They operated independently of Frankfort, he said, and "[tihere
[was] no evidence that the state control[led] the operations of the day to day
activities of the airport board." '80 Comair also maintained that the airport's
funding did not come from the state treasury.'' The financial support that
came out of the state treasury was miniscule, Stopher said-he recalled
that there was evidence of only one grant for $200,000 for box hangar
construction, and the state leased some weather equipment for fifty dollars
a month to the airport.' Stopher said that the airport had a budget in the
tens of millions of dollars, concluding that it was not an agency controlled
or funded by the state government."'
Utilizing the Berns analysis, Stopher said he had heard no support for the
idea that the airport board was supported by the state. 184 It was supported
almost entirely by non-state entities, he said.'
A favorable ruling came
down for the airport regarding its status of immunity in 1985, but the law
had evolved and changed since then.'86 Put simply, the Berns test was
now the law, Stopher said.8 7 Though Inco was never explicitly overruled,
Stopher said the Supreme Court of Kentucky had the option to use Inco in
the Autry case, but instead used the Berns test.18
174 Id. (citing Berns, 8oi S.W.2d at 329).
175
176
177
178
179
i8o
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
188 Id.; Autry v. W. Ky. Univ.,

219

S-W.3d 713, 716 (Ky. 2007).
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In issuing the trial court's ruling, Judge Ishmael said, "I understand that
my ruling today will have an impact. And all I can tell the different families
and the different corporate entities is that I've taken my best shot.' ' 8 9
First, Judge Ishmael turned to Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution,
reiterating that it was clear that counties enjoy sovereign immunity. 9°
He also said it was clear that the LFUCG was immune from suit.19' The
question, however, remained whether the entities they had created and the
92
members of the airport board were immune.
Beginning with the Inco case, Judge Ishmael noted that the airport
was entitled to sovereign immunity and that Inco had not been expressly
overruled or modified. 93 Comair persuasively argued that though Inco
was not overruled, it was subject to scrutiny."9 Yet, Judge Ishmael said
he saw a distinction between the creation of the airport board and the
airport corporation, and the creation of the Kentucky Center for the Arts in
Berns.' 9s The reason the airport board was created was to provide financing
and to issue revenue bonds for the airport, he said, while the Kentucky
Center for the Arts was created directly by statute.' 9 The airport board and
airport corporation are more like direct arms or agencies of the LFUCG,
he stated.' 97 "The urban county government gave birth to them," Judge
Ishmael said, "they've got to be considered part and parcel of the urban
county government... [and] the urban county government is immune[,]
and as a creation of the government, the board and the corporation ... [are]
also entitled to the immunity of its creator."' 98 Addressing the Inco decision
and its continuing status as good law, he said, "If there was intention to
overrule or modify Inco, surely to goodness someone would have addressed
that.... I just can't fathom that Inco is not the law of the land unless some
court says that's what we're supposed to do."' 99
In his final analysis, Judge Ishmael noted his position as a trial court
judge, maintaining that he did not believe he could disregard or ignore
a clear appellate principle.2 00 The appellate court had spoken in Inco,
and said that the airport board was entitled to sovereign immunity, which
Judge Ishmael believed was shared by the airport corporation as well. "I
189 Videotape, supra note i5o.
19o

Id.; Ky.

CONST. § 231.

191 Videotape, supranote 150.
192

Id.

193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.

198 Id.
i99 Id.
2oo Id.
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don't think I have the authority or the jurisdiction to overrule Inco," Judge
Ishmael said. 0' "I think Inco is still the law, and if they want to change
it, at somebody's request or suggestion, then I'll certainly follow that
precedent." 02
B. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky
"Given the importance of the issues, . . . [the Supreme Court of
Kentucky] transferred the [Comairlitigation] from the Court of Appeals'
docket to its own."2 03 The court heard oral arguments on August 17, 2008,
but the court's decision was not finally released until October 1, 2009.0 4
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Judge
Ishmael's decision, and cemented the airport's immune status. 05
Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Mary Noble wrote the Comair
decision.2 °0 Noble noted in the outset of her opinion that "[d]espite the
frequency of opinions on the subject from this Court, the law of sovereign
immunity, and the related doctrines of governmental immunity, official
immunity, and qualified official immunity, is still difficult to apply, no doubt
in part because of the large number of decisions on the subject." 0 7 In
addition to these conflicting decisions, Justice Noble noted the effect of
changes in the "[a]ttitudes about the propriety of immunity ... over time
and personnel changes on the Court." 08
Noble noted that sovereign immunity's reach has become complicated
when dealing with entities that are below the level of the state.2 09 Noble
reaffirmed the immune status of counties and the liability of municipalities,
but noted that "[n]umerous other entities ... fall outside this taxonomy of
city versus state and county, and it is not immediately clear whether they are
agencies of the state, and therefore possibly entitled to immunity, or more
akin to municipal corporations, and are therefore liable in tort." 10 Noble
then discussed airport boards themselves, noting "confusion surrounding
[their] exact legal nature," and recognizing that they have been described
in numerous decisions as "municipal corporation[s]. '' I While such a label

202

Id.
Id.

203

Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 94

201

(Ky. 2009).

Id.at 91.
Id.at 93.
at 92.
zo6 Id.
207 Id. at 94.
204
205

2o8 Id.
209

Id.at 95.
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Id.
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Id. (citing Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd. v. Bridges Aircraft Sales &
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would make them liable for suit under Haney, Noble stated that these cases
did not have anything to do with immunity, and "may have used the term
,municipal corporation' more as a way to identify an entity." ' The only
case to specifically deal with the issue is Inco, Noble
said, and in that case,
13
the court granted the airport board immunity
Much of Noble's decision appropriately focused on the Berns test, and
perhaps the most striking element of the decision is her evisceration of an
objective test that had been relied upon by courts across the Commonwealth
for decades. Noble stated that in Berns, the court tried to solve the problem
that "plague[d] the courts"-the difference between an immune state
14
agency and a municipal agency."
The court noted that Berns created a
test, but that "the Court did not appear to have a single coherent rule."' '
Noble described how the court first determined that the entity in Berns was
not performing a governmental function, which "alone would have been
sufficient to find that the Center for the Arts lacked immunity." ' 6 The
court went further and looked to the Gnau case's "'direction and control"'
two-part test."1 7 While the Berns court ultimately returned to a discussion of
the sort of function (governmental or proprietary) that the entity is carrying
out, "it is the narrower, 'two-pronged test' that is frequently cited as the test
2
for sovereign immunity." 18
Noble highlighted what she perceived to be a recent change in the way
Berns had been applied, noting "a shift in focus to the nature of the entity,"
recalling recent cases that focused on whether "the entity is carryingout a
function integralto state government."1 9 Noble believed the earlier focus on
the two-part test in Berns was misplaced, and instead sought to limit its
use.22 0 The Berns test was "overly simple, failing to allow for subtlety, and
too limiting."22' The two-pronged test is still helpful, she stated, but "[t]he
more important aspect of Berns is the focus on whether the entity exercises
Serv., Inc., 46o S.W2d 18, 19 (Ky. 1970); Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W2d
531, 534 (Ky. 1969); Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 389 S.W.zd
637,638 (Ky. 1965)).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 95-96 (citing Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Bd., 705
S.W2d 933,934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985)).
214 Comair,295 S.W3d at 97.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. (quoting Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 346 S.W.2d
754 (Ky. 1961)).
218 Id. at 98 (citing Kea-Ham Contracting, Inc. v. Floyd County Dev. Auth., 37 S.W3d
703, 706 (Ky. 2000); Withers v. Univ. of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340,342 (Ky. 1997); Calvert Invs., Inc.
v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 805 S.W.zd 133, 137 (Ky. 1991)).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 99.
z21 Id.
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a governmental function, which that decision explains means a 'function
integral to state government. "'22
This search for an integral state function is what finally clothed the
airport board in immunity. In addition to significant control by an immune
county government, Noble stated, "The Airport Board also carries out a
function integral to state government in that it exists solely to provide
and maintain part of the Commonwealth's air transportation infrastructure
(i.e., the airport). 2 2z3 Like state highways and county roads, the airport
was engaged in important transportation services, and retained similar
4
immunity.11
Ultimately, Noble's decision centered around a return to the more
subjective governmental/proprietary distinction, and an abandonment
of the objective, fact-driven, Berns test. While previous courts lamented
the unpredictability of using a governmental/ proprietary distinction, the
Comaircourt seems to have felt too limited by the inflexibility of the more
defined and objective rule.
III.

MOVING

FORWARD

WITH COMAIR

Justice Noble's opinion is well-written and easy to understand, and
indeed "lay[s] the cards on the table" 2 ' in regards to sovereign immunity.
It seems, however, that the court has taken a step backwards towards
reliance on what the Haney court recognized as the misapplied, inconsistent
and subjective proprietary/governmental distinction. Berns added a layer
of simple, straightforward analysis, in which financial figures and by-laws
could be examined for funding and control. These elements could give
a clear determination of sovereign immunity, only giving the privilege to
those entities that are so closely aligned with their creators as to deserve
immunity. This objective test seemed to be a step in the right direction.
To a certain extent, after the Comair case, it appears we are back to the
same confusing mess that frustrated the court in Haney.
A. The Supreme Court Missed an Opportunity to Reexamine the Doctrine of
Absolute Sovereign Immunity, Especially in Regards to the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government, a Community Where the Weaknesses of the Doctrine
Were FirstNoted in Haney.
Lexington perhaps demonstrates most clearly the unfairness of
' ' 6
sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity truly is a "legal anachronism,
222

Id.(quoting Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 8oi S.W.2d 327, 332 (Ky. I99O)).

223 Id. at ioi.
224

Id.

225

Id. at 99.
Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
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that runs counter to the essential idea that those who commit torts should
be held liable for them."2 7 Precedent is important, but as the court in Haney
notes, when a theory loses its basis in logic, it should be disregarded.""
Though the court propounded these ideas more than forty years ago, the
concept that those wronged by actions of the City of Lexington should
have some sort of recourse has not lost its appeal. Just as the family that
lost Alene Faye Haney in the pool at Woodland Park deserved to at least
see the City of Lexington in court, Comair deserved the right to see the
LFUCG argue its liability in court. 29
Sovereign immunity is unfair, and runs counter to the basic ideas behind
liability and negligence. This unfairness is evident in the case of the Comair
crash. The charter for the LFUCG is quite clear that the entity created
when the two governments merged gained the powers and privileges of
both cities and counties. 30 Yet, it seems unfair that the LFUCG gained the
"powers and privileges" of a city and a county but the limitations of neither
of them. While cities have liabilities for their torts, counties have no such
limitations. 23 ' This liability for torts disappeared the day that the LFUCG
was created, and it subsequently gained the privilege of immunity. The
jettisoning of the limitation of liability seems to be a huge incentive for
choosing the merged government form. It also appears to be wholly unfair
to those who choose to live in a merged government over those who live in
a regular municipality. Those who live in a city have clear recourse against
the city they live in for the torts committed by it, while those who live in
Lexington are not able to sue their "city."
This obstacle to Lexington citizens recovering against the city exists
despite the fact that the citizens are probably unaware of any distinction
between the two types of entities, which appear on the surface to be very
similar, but are legally very different. This argument harkens back to Justice
Palmore's now-famous dissent in Cullinan,a touchstone along Kentucky's
road from Haney to Berns, towards the limitation of the application of
sovereign immunity. 32 With its decision in the Comair case, however, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky appears to have again strayed from this path.
Though the court was quite clear in its analysis in Haney, its declaration
that "the rule is liability-the exception is immunity" seems to have been

227 Id.
228 Id.
229

Id.

230 See LEXINGTON-FAYETrE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Ky., CHARTER AND CODE OF
ORDINANCES art. 3, §3.01 (1999 & Supp. 2009), availableat http://www.municode.com/resourc-

es/gateway.aspx?pid=1 i 163&sid= 17.
231 See supra Part I.A-B.
232 Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d
133, 138 (Ky. 1991) (quoting Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.zd 407, 411 (Ky. 1967)
(Palmore, J., dissenting)).
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largely ignored 33 While the court did stop short of making its decision
apply to counties and noted that county immunity remained a strong
concept, the Haney decision predated the establishment of the merged
county and city governments.3 4 With commentators and justices noting
both the decline in the application of the concept of sovereign immunity,
as well as increasing hostility towards its application, why should Kentucky
allow the mere adoption of a new governmental form to lead to avoidance of
the liability that the courts had so forcefully placed on the city of Lexington
a mere decade before the community entered into the urban county form
of government?
B. The Berns Test Was an Important Objective Tool in Determining Immunity,
and the Subjectivity of the GovernmentallProprietaryDistinction
Will Bring Back Confusion.
As Justice Noble recognized, the exact nature of the airport entities is
unclear. 35 To simply call them an arm of the government itself ignores
authorities that have recognized that the airport board is a "municipal
corporation,"2 36 robbed by Haney of its immunity, as well as the Attorney
General's opinions that state that Blue Grass Airport is a municipal
corporation the exact nature of which remains unclear due to a confusing
tangle of case law and statutory interpretation.137 While the court's opinion
in Comairwouldappear to confine this labeling of the airport as a "municipal
corporation" to simply a label and nothing more, such a decision seems
dangerous. The term "municipal corporation" is more than a mere label,
as it carries a great deal of meaning with it. Making the decision as to
whether an entity retains immunity seems to be a close decision at times,
and at such times, what sort of entity an agency was created as or how
it has held itself out to be can be very important. If indeed the airport
is a municipal corporation, then its immunity is clearly extinguished by
Haney. If there remains any confusion about its status, the Berns test was
created precisely to clear up that confusion by examining just how closely
the airport is connected to the organization that created it. To simply state
that the labeling of an entity as a "municipal corporation" carries with it
none of the baggage associated with such entities overlooks the important

233 See Haney, 386 S.W.2d at 742 (quoting Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618,

6z5 (Wis.

1962)).

234 LFUCG was established in i974. See Chief of Police, supranote io5.Haney, however,

was decided in 1964. Haney, 386 S.W.2d 738.
235 See Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 9I,
99 (Ky. 20o9).
236 See Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 389 S.W.2d 637, 638
(Ky. 1965).
237 See 86 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (Ky. 1986); 8o Op. Att'y Gen. 333 (Ky. 198o).
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differences between municipal corporations and immune governmental
entities.
Immunity is not a clear-cut decision. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
made it abundantly clear that an evaluation of the proprietary/ministerial
distinction remains important in the context of state-created agencies and
their immunity. 8 But focusing on these ideas and ignoring the importance
of other, more objective tests, could lead to the expansion of the sovereign
immunity doctrine. In Berns, the court clearly worried about the expansion
of immunity to any state-created agency.139 The sort of wild expansion
envisioned by the Berns court appears to be inspired by the type of analysis
that was applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Inco-an immune
creator means an immune agency. Berns was decided to avoid the sorts of
quick judgments that the court in Inco ultimately arrived at in their decision.
Until the court's decision in Comair,Berns reflected limits to the application
of sovereign immunity in Kentucky, and it has been cited in subsequent
decisions since it was decided in 1990.z4 Notably, the Kea-Ham decision
found that an agency specifically created by a county lacked the control
and funding to share in the county's immunity.2 41 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky itself makes perhaps the best case for the importance of the Berns
test in Withers. When referring to Berns, the court stated that "[t]he time
has come to put an end to the uncertainty which has existed in this area
of the law. As stated hereinabove, a test has been developed to determine
whether an entity possesses the immunity of the Commonwealth."' 4
If Kentucky is going to maintain a system of governmental sovereign
immunity, tests need to be maintained and consistently used to determine
when it is appropriate for an agency that really functions as an alter-ego or
arm of the state to share in its creator's sovereign immunity. Berns appeared
to be the most sensible and easily applicable case, as its two prongs of
control and funding accurately assess what it means to be a necessary and
protected arm of the state. 43 This establishment of an objective, factbased system for analysis provided for easy application. As the court made
clear in Yanero, the proprietary/governmental distinction has never left us
when analyzing state agencies. 2 "4To avoid uncertainty, the court faithfully
4
1 While the Comair
applied Berns in the past, yet rejected it in Comair.1
238 See Comair,295 S.W3d at 99.
239 See Ky. Ctr. for the Arts Corp. v. Berns, 8oi S.W.2d 327,331 (Ky. 199o).
240 Id.; see also Withers v. Univ. of Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340,346 (Ky. 1997).
241 Kea-Ham Contracting, Inc. v. Floyd County Dev. Auth., 37 S.W.3d 703, 706 (Ky.
2000).
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court decried its inflexibility, in gutting the Berns test, the court may have
brought back the same uncertainty and inconsistency that plagued the
Commonwealth's law concerning municipalities prior to Haney.
CONCLUSION: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Following Justice Noble's decision and the apparent removal of the
Berns test from Kentucky's jurisprudence, there seems little standing in
the way of an expansion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Without
an objective test that is easily applied, and with a return to the subjective
use of the proprietary/governmental distinction, we will likely continue to
see inconsistent decisions across the Commonwealth. The arbitrary and
unpredictable distinctions for municipalities noted by the court in Haney
will return in cases concerning state agencies. The doctrine itself remains
confusing and unfair, and any decision further entrenching the doctrine in
Kentucky will only lead to more unfairness.
If we must keep the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Kentucky must be
diligent in limiting it to situations where its application is truly appropriate.
In 1985, when an airplane slammed into a snow bank at Blue Grass Airport,
it may have been acceptable and easy to simply determine that the airport
was an immune arm of the government. But when Comair Flight 5191
crashed into a pasture that Sunday morning in August, taking forty-nine
lives with it, the gravity of the situation should serve as a reminder of the
repercussions that such a decision regarding immunity can have.

